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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the impact of central – local relations on the performance of local 
service delivery networks set up by central government. Analyzing network literature leaves 
us with some questions about the impact of coordination strategies of central government 
as a possible determinant of network-level effectiveness for this type of network and the 
possible interaction between central government coordination (as part of the network 
context) and internal network dynamics and the combined effects hereof on the 
effectiveness of mandated service delivery networks in particular. Our analysis shows that 
both levels are important to explain the outcomes of the Primary Health Care networks in 
Flanders. Our study also leads to some important observations about the meaning of ‘central 
government coordination’ in this context. 
                                                          
1 This text is based on research conducted within the frame of the Policy Research Centre on Governmental Organization ‐ 
Decisive Governance (SBOV III ‐ 2012‐2015), funded by the Flemish government. The views expressed herein are those of 
the author(s) and not those of the Flemish government. 
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1. Problem statement 
During the last decades, new governance arrangements like networks and partnerships 
became increasingly popular in various policy domains (Teisman and Klijn, 2002). Main driver 
of the public sector to create and engage in such arrangements is to maintain and create 
government capacity “by bringing together coalition partners with appropriate resources, 
non-governmental as well as governmental” (Stone 1993:1, cited in Agranoff and McGuire 
2003:25). One such type of governance arrangement is a mandated service delivery network 
on the local level, installed by central government to achieve efficient and effective service 
delivery for citizens (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; O’Toole 1997).  
With the increased use of such arrangements by governments around the globe, the 
question of their performance(s) also became increasingly popular to study. Provan and 
Milward (1995) pioneered with a preliminary model of network effectiveness, focusing on 
the impact of network structure and network context determinants on the performance of 
mental care networks in the U.S. This model was later updated (Provan and Milward, 2001) 
and has been expanded by Turrini et.al. (2010), based on an extensive literature review. The 
integrated framework of network effectiveness by Turrini et.al. lists a range of structural, 
functional and contextual determinants. Some of those determinants are explicitly focused 
on external relations (‘external control’), while others appear internal but can also be 
affected or arranged by external actors like central government (e.g. ‘formalization’ or 
‘accountability’). We are interested in both sets, because in the Flemish context under study 
in this paper, the Flemish government has a reputation for creating a whole set of 
frameworks that create local networks in different policy domains.  
Provan and Milward (1995) found that direct mechanisms of control lead to better 
performance. In a more moderate vein, Scharpf (1997) defined ‘the shadow of hierarchy’ – 
essentially the threat of government to intervene in the network - to make networks work 
and perform. Yet, in practice, partnership and network arrangements are commonly 
considered as requiring sufficiently high levels of autonomy to deliver local services, fitting 
the local context (Struyven and Van Hemel, 2009). More importantly, while the work of 
Provan and Milward shows (among other things) that external control matters, the literature 
is relatively poor in showing how it matters exactly, and how different frameworks, including  
3 
 
possible control strategies, are used by central government, under which conditions, and 
with what effect. We need to learn more about the interaction between direct and indirect 
effects of actions of central government (clustered in one or more roles) and the local 
network dynamics, and the combined effects hereof on the effectiveness of mandated 
service delivery networks at the local level. Hence, we address the following research 
questions in this paper: 1) How can we measure the performance of mandated service 
delivery networks in Flanders; 2) What are the roles of a central government in this type of 
network; 3) What is the impact of those steering and coordination activities in the central – 
local relations on the performance of those networks; 4) What is the relation between 
metagovernance roles used by central government and local network dynamics and what 
are the combined effects hereof on network-level effectiveness? 
The questions will be answered using a single case, analyzing the case of local primary health 
care networks in Flanders (‘Samenwerkingsinitiatieven Eerstelijnsgezondheidszorg’, SEL). 
Primary health care networks are an example of a mandated service delivery network, set up 
by the Flemish Government to improve the quality of collaboration in the field of primary 
health care services.  
2. Conceptual framework 
In order to answer our research questions, we developed a conceptual framework consisting 
of three main building blocks: network context, network dynamics, and network 
performance. The framework is presented in the figure below and each block will be 
discussed in more detail in the next sections. The framework is used in a larger research 
project (see below). In this paper, we only report one sub-case. 
Figure 1 – Framework of network performance in central – local relations 
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Network context or the steering and coordination activities of a central government 
The network context, in this research, equals primarily the steering and coordination 
strategies of a central government, because these strategies make up (part of) the context 
for the local networks, affecting (in part) its dynamics and performance. Imposing mandated 
networks implies automatically a certain classical government steering activity, dominated 
by regulation and systems of control. But those activities and control systems cover a range 
of different instruments and even then it remains to be researched how those instruments 
are applied in the daily interactions with the local networks.  
Besides the ‘traditional’ government steering, the network literature provides the concept of 
meta-governance to define different roles that governments can play vis-à-vis networks 
(Jessop 2003; Kooiman 1993; Sørensen and Torfing 2009). Meta-governance is linked to the 
fact that traditional ways of steering society (by means of direct regulation and control) do 
not match with the so called self-organizing character of public networks. Even in the 
context of mandated networks, imposed due to a policy dictate, the installing authority 
could and (according to the network scholars), also should take a step back of hierarchical 
steering mechanisms and rely on more subtle forms of governance permitting government 
to let go without losing control (see also Kelly 2006).  
5 
 
Sørensen and Torfing (2009) identify four distinct meta-governance roles that state actors 
can adopt in policy networks. The meta-governance tools range from more distant hands-off 
tools (design and framing) towards hands-on approaches (management and participation) in 
which there is a close interaction between public actors and the network members.  The first 
tool in the meta-governance tool-box is hands-off network design. Following the authors, 
this role aims to “influence the scope, character, composition and institutional procedures of 
the network” (p. 246). In the network design role, government seeks to create social and 
political meaning and identity for the network. The second role is network framing. Hereby 
government sets out the political goals, financial conditions and legal basis for the network. 
In practice, network framing can include a range of different activities. Network 
management focuses on facilitating and guiding interactions in the network. In this role 
governmental actors try for example to settle conflicts or reduce tensions amongst network 
members. In the fourth role, network participation, the public metagovernor becomes one 
of the members of the network. In network participation, state actors do not take on a 
hierarchical position. Sørensen and Torfing state that public metagovernors should best 
adopt a mix of hands-off and hands-on meta-governance tools.  
Although one might argue that the concept of meta-governance does not fit mandated 
service delivery networks because of their imposed character, we need research to come to 
this conclusion because only the reconstruction of the daily implementation can reveal the 
real nature of formal instruments. That is also the case for the meta – governance set: it is 
possible that the implementation of so – called meta – governance style instruments, reveals 
government – like type of steering. It is worthwhile to see to what extent those government 
and meta – governance roles can be linked to actual coordination strategies (Temmerman 
et.al. 2013). We use the well-known trinity hierarchy – market – network to address the 
actions of the Flemish government in its role as network designer and network framer. The 
three mechanisms and associated instruments are all part of the everlasting challenge for 
central governments to achieve coordination of actors, resources and activities to achieve 
public goals (Bouckaert et al. 2010).  
Table 1: The features of hierarchies, markets and networks 
 Hierarchy Market Network 
Base of interaction Authority and Exchange and Cooperation and 
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dominance competition solidarity 
Purpose Consciously designed 
and controlled goals 
Spontaneously 
created results 
Consciously designed 
purposes or 
spontaneously 
created results 
Guidance, control 
and evaluation 
Top down norms and 
standards, routines, 
supervision, 
inspection, 
intervention 
Supply and demand, 
price mechanism, 
self-interest, profit 
and losses as 
evaluation, courts, 
invisible hand 
Shared values, 
common problem 
analyses, consensus, 
loyalty, reciprocity, 
trust, informal 
evaluation – 
reputation 
Role of government Top-down rule-
maker and steering, 
dependent actors 
are controlled by 
rules 
Creator and guardian 
of markets, 
purchaser of goods, 
actors are 
independent 
Network enabler, 
network manager 
and network 
participant 
Resources needed Authority 
Power 
Bargaining 
Information and 
Power 
Mutual Cooptation 
Trust 
Theoretical basis Weberian 
bureaucracy 
Neo-institutional 
economics 
Network theory 
(from Bouckaert, Peters & Verhoest 2010; based on Thompson et al. 1991, O’Toole 1997, Kaufmann 
et al. 1986, Peters 2003) 
 
It is clear that the impact of central government on local networks can vary, due to those 
sets of coordination instruments set up by central government. One extreme on the 
continuum are mandated networks that are nothing more than ‘executing shops’ with little 
or no autonomy, in which external partners are more or less forced by central government 
by law or through subsidies to be part (hierarchical coordination). Some would not even call 
them networks, but multi-actor agents. The other extreme on the continuum are voluntary 
networks that experience high levels of autonomy, and which central government does not 
try to control or rather stimulates and facilitates (more market or network like). The latter 
‘group’ are the networks that most clearly fit the general network definition of multiple 
autonomous actors that are interdependent and engage in resources exchange to acquire 
their own goals, but contribute to a ‘higher’ network or collaborative goal as well (Koppenjan 
and Klijn, 2004; Huxham and Vangen, 2005). The challenge for researchers and government 
is then to know for which goals a very strong control or a more ‘laissez faire’ strategy is 
optimal/most likely to lead to success. 
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It is important to make a distinction between the nature of the formal coordination 
mechanisms and instruments on the one hand, and their actual use on the other. Verhoest 
et al. (2010) for instance show how the governance by the public actors in public-private 
partnerships in Flanders can appear to be more hierarchic, market, or network like from the 
outside, while the actual control mix is quite different from the inside.  
Network dynamics or the interplay between network functioning and network structure 
On the one hand, the roles and coordination strategies of central government have an 
impact on the dynamics at the local network level. On the other hand, networks themselves 
will have a dynamic of their own that cannot be fully explained by or attributed to that 
strategy. According to Bryson and Crosby (2006), local network dynamic is the result of the 
interplay between network structure and network functioning.  
The topic of network structure as a determinant of network effectiveness receives of lot of 
attention in existing literature (Provan and Milward 1995 and 2001). However, there is a lot 
of variation in the criteria scholars use to measure network structure. In the context of this 
study we focus on four criteria of network structure. The first component is the origin of the 
network and how they are conceived (mandated and top-down or voluntary from the 
bottom-up (Kenis and Provan, 2009). The second component is network governance at the 
level of the network itself. Provan and Kenis (2007) distinguish between three forms of 
network governance (participant-governed network, lead organization-governed networks 
and network administrative organization). In participant governed networks, the 
coordination role is conducted by the members themselves. The authors state that this form 
is mostly suited for small networks in which direct contacts are relatively easy to organize.  
The shared authority form switches to a lead-agency network when one of the members 
takes a lead position in the network. The third governance form is the NAO, where “a 
separate administrative entity is set up specifically to govern the network and its activities” 
(Provan and Kenis, 2007:236). The other criteria under attention are membership 
(composition and size) and financial structure (i.e. the funding of the network). 
With regard to the topic of network functioning, we focus on four criteria. The first element 
is the division of power. The study of power is a key issue in networks since power is more 
often than not unequally distributed amongst members (Agranoff and McGuire 1999). We 
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make a distinction between sources of power and the use of power. Following resource 
dependency theory, we regard having and controlling resources and their provision as 
sources of power. Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) define five types of resources in policy 
networks: financial capacities, production capacities, competences, knowledge and 
legitimacy. Huxham and Vangen (2006) distinguish between three types of use of power: 
power over, power for and power to. Power to reflects a view of working in networks, 
whereby actors use their power resources for the purpose of collaborative advantage and 
not at the expense of others (Voets, 2008). The second component of network functioning is 
the level of trust among network participants. In fact, the level of trust can be both a 
performance measure as a determinant of network success. In this study, we use the 
concept of trust as a condition of network functioning. Nooteboom (1996) distinguishes 
between competence trust and behavioral trust. Competence trust is based on the 
expectation that all actors are competent in light of the objectives the network should 
achieve. Behavioral trust is of a more relational nature and rests on the expectation that all 
actors will act faire and predictable (Van Gestel et.al. 2009).  
In recent years, the study of network management as a predictor of network success has 
received considerable attention (Kickert et.al. 1997; Agranoff and McGuire 1999 en 2001; 
Koppenjan et.al. 1993; Milward and Provan 2006; Klijn 2005; Klijn and Koppenjan 2004; Klijn 
et.al. 2010; Meier and O’Toole 2001). A well-known and often used classification of network 
management activities is that of Agranoff and McGuire (2001), who distinguish four sets: 
activating, framing, mobilizing and synthesizing. Activation activities focus on selecting the 
right participants and resources for the network. In the context of framing, network 
managers influence the perceptions, norms and values of the network. Mobilizing behavior 
is aimed at building commitment and support for the network. The last role is synthesizing. 
In general, the aim of synthesizing is to “lower the costs of interaction, which can be 
substantial in network settings” (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001: 301). Turrini et.al. (2010) also 
point to the importance of traditional managerial work, stating that a network manager is 
also responsible for the correct implementation of administrative systems and processes. 
The fourth component under study is leadership. In networks, both formal and informal 
leadership roles are important (Agranoff and McGuire, 2003). Some important capacities of 
a good leader include authority, vision, long-term commitment, relational skills and political 
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skills (Bryson, Crosby and Stone 2006). In this study, we focus both on the position of the 
formally appointed network manager and network leader (i.e. the president, director, …). 
Network performance 
We assume that central governments’ coordination strategies and the local network 
dynamics have an impact on network performance.  Analyzing performance of networks is 
however not a simple task, because different stakeholders of the network can have different 
expectations about the network benefits. Central government itself should have some 
ambitions regarding its performance, since central government took the initiative to install 
those mandated networks.  But maybe other arguments than performance inspired central 
government initiative? And it certainly is possible that local networks have a different view 
on the effectiveness of their network. So the key question in network performance is  
effectiveness from whom? (Provan and Milward 1995; Milward and Provan 2001). To answer 
this, we need to identify performance criteria at three levels of analysis: community, 
network and organization (Milward and Provan, 2001). In the context of service delivery 
networks, a fourth level is that of the individual customer, client, citizen or company. In this 
paper we focus on the second level, namely the performance of networks at network level 
or whole-network effectiveness (Provan et.al. 2007; Provan and Lemaire 2012).  
 
The question then is what relevant performance measures or criteria might be. Hard 
performance measures focus on content outcomes or ‘product performance’ (Voets et al. 
2008). In service delivery networks these are, for example, the number of services provided 
or the number of clients reached. Soft performance measures focus on process-oriented 
values, like the quality of relations between actors. They are mostly measured through the 
perceptions of participants (Head, 2008). As service delivery networks are created to provide 
their services, but since the relationships between network members are also important for 
successful service delivery, we consider both hard and soft performance measures in this 
study (Caplan en Jones 2002; Sørensen en Torfing 2009; Mandell et.al. 1994; Mandell and 
Keast 2008). In this paper, we focus on three common studied process outcomes. The first 
process value is the development of a shared vision and language amongst the network 
members (Mandell and Keast, 2008). The second criteria is internal legitimacy. Following 
Human and Provan (2000), internal legitimacy refers to the degree of network commitment 
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or the level of support of the members for the network goals. Finally, we consider the 
number and strength of long-term relationships that are built in the network (Kenis and 
Provan, 2008). 
 
3. Methodology and case description 
Methodology 
The research questions dealt with in this paper are part of a wider research project analyzing 
the impact of central – local relations on the performance of mandated service delivery 
networks. The research project follows a multiple, comparative case study design (Yin, 
1994), consisting of three cases (in three different policy domains to control for sector-
specific features), and three embedded cases in each case to control for local context factors 
and specific network dynamics. Each network in each policy domain under study (health 
care, social economy and water policy) shows a different mix of control strategies by the 
Flemish government. In this paper we present the results of the first subcase in the case of 
primary health care networks, namely the network in the region of Ghent (being the second 
biggest city of Flanders -230.000 inhabitants - and the network having a regional range of 
900.000 inhabitants). 
Data are obtained using a mixed method approach. In a first step we conducted a 
comprehensive analysis of written material like policy documents, evaluation reports, 
meeting reports, internal notes, etc. Secondly, in this case, we conducted nine semi-
structured interviews with partners of the network.2 Respondents were contacted and 
selected using strategic sampling. Network members represent different disciplines, 
different professional positions and different positions in the network (core vs. periphery). 
As such, we guarantee a representative sample of perceptions and opinions. In addition to 
the interviews respondents were asked to fill in a survey on a 5 point Likert scale.3 The aim 
of the questionnaire is to standardize perceptions about the steering and coordination 
activities of the Flemish government. Also, we conducted two interviews with civil servants 
of the Agency of Healthcare. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. Afterwards, data 
has been coded using Nvivo software (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
                                                          
2
 See annex 1 for an overview of the respondents 
3
 See annex 2 
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Case description 
The empirical setting of our study are the primary health care networks (‘SEL’) in Flanders. 
Since 2010, 15 SEL are established in the Flemish region of Belgium. They are the successor 
of the former home care networks (‘Samenwerkingsinitiatieven inzake Thuiszorg’ ‘OVOSIT’) 
so they are not entirely new and perhaps this path dependency has an impact on the new 
structure and functioning.  In this paper we conduct a single case study of one primary 
health care network in the region of Ghent (‘SEL Gent’) 
According to the Primary Health Care Decree (2004), a SEL is ‘a partnership acknowledged by 
the Flemish government and composed of representatives of professional care tenders and 
possibly also of representatives of care givers and care users and/or volunteers, aimed at the 
optimization of care in a demarcated geographical area’ (Art. 2). For this end, SEL’s need to 
implement 12 concrete tasks (Art. 10). The working area of the partnership needs to match 
the welfare and health regions, which are administrative areas used for welfare planning 
demarcated in the Decree on Healthcare Regions of 2003. Map 1 gives an overview of the 
SEL regions in Flanders. 
Map 1 – Health care regions in Flanders 
 
4. Research findings 
Network structure of SEL in general and of SEL Ghent 
In the decree, the Flemish government sets out some rules regarding the structure of the 
network, discussed here following the criteria of Kenis and Provan. First of all, the SEL’s are 
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mandated by a top-down decision of the Flemish government. Secondly, each network 
needs to be a nonprofit organization (‘VZW’). In Belgium, this type of association has an own 
legal status. The organization is constituted by three separate board structures with 
representatives of the network members. The board structures are authorized to take 
decisions and to define the guiding lines for the functioning of the partnership. As such, the 
governance structure of the SEL is of a NAO type. Thirdly, the decree identifies seven 
mandatory network partners: health insurance organizations, general practitioners, home 
assistance services, local service centres, local social offices, retirement homes and 
nurses/midwifes. Legislation also states that a general practitioner needs to be chosen as 
president or vice-president of the network,  because this person is regarded as a key figure 
in the delivery of primary health care. The Primary Health Care networks receive public 
funding from the Flemish government. Annually, the Flemish government donates 60.000 
euro, increased with 0.20 euro per inhabitant.4 To get this funding, SEL’s have to make an 
annual budget that is controlled by the Agency of Healthcare. Afterwards, the actual 
achievements need to be accounted for  in an annual report. The partners do not bring in 
own financial resources. At first sight, the network structure of a SEL is subject of a 
hierarchical coordination strategy, since the local networks have no formal autonomy to 
decide on their creation, composition, governance structure, and financing. 
With more than 900.000 inhabitants in the area, SEL Ghent is the second biggest SEL in 
Flanders. SEL Ghent is a split off of the previous home care network (‘OVOSIT’) that was 
active in the whole province of East-Flanders. However, the hierarchical decision for the 
transition from SIT to SEL has activated some tensions in this region. This was mainly due to 
the fact that some local partners feared the loss of the local embeddedness in the new 
structure, as OVOSIT functioned as an umbrella organization that covered 26 local SIT 
partnerships. The local partnerships were only populated by care workers active in the field, 
whereas the board structures of OVOSIT were composed out of executives and managers. 
The Primary Health Care decree defines the possibility for the SEL to split up their working 
area in smaller areas “if this seems necessary to optimize the quality of health care” (Art. 13). 
SEL Ghent used this opportunity and is internally decentralized in five units. However, this 
                                                          
4
 The SEL also receive allowance from the federal government for the administrative support of home care 
(Geïntegreerde dienst voor Thuiszorg, ‘GDT’). This is however a small part of the annual budget and is not the 
focus of our study. 
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decision is merely the outcome of a compromise between the partners in which the Flemish 
government did not intervene. Some local partners were not very positive about the 
transition from local SIT units to five decentralized SEL units in the region. “One has 
destroyed some local spontaneous partnerships there” (respondent 8). A general practitioner 
states: “Even the decentralized SEL units are too big. I do not have affinity with the head 
nurse of a home care organization from the neighboring community because she does not 
share the same patients as I do. So it has become too big” (respondent 6). The hierarchical 
intervention of the Flemish government to change the network structure and to establish it 
on a larger scale, clearly affected some local dynamics in the network in a negative way.  
The decentralized SEL units join a mix of field workers and executives from organizations. At 
central level, SEL Ghent is directed by a General Assembly, a Board of Directors and a 
Management Board. In the board structures, all partners are – at least on paper - equally 
represented. The mandatory partners of SEL Ghent also made the decision to invite five 
additional partners. The Board of Directors is authorized to take the strategic decisions, 
whereas the Management Board is responsible for the daily operation of the partnership.  
The General Assembly gathers twice a year and approves the regulations of the organization, 
the composition of the board structures, the annual budget and annual report, … The 
president of SEL Ghent is a general practitioner. The network counts 2 network coordinators 
(1,5 FTE) and 1 management assistant. The staff is paid with SEL resources. 
Network context: steering and coordination activities of central government  
The position of central government is analyzed using the toolbox of meta-governance 
(Sørensen and Torfing, 2009). The authors distinguish between hands-off and hands-on 
roles. In the context of the primary health care networks, the Flemish government does not 
act as a manager in the network nor is it an active partner. As such, the central level does  
coordinate the network from a distance, in a hands-off manner and mainly by designing and 
framing. But how does the central government coordinates and what are the effects of the 
mix of possible coordination strategies (hierarchy, market and networking)? 
As explained before, The Primary Health Care Decree (2004) and the Administrative order 
(2008) set out a number of rules regarding the network structure. Some of those regulations 
are part of a strict hierarchical coordination strategy (for example the VZW structure, the 
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NAO model, the number of mandated partners, the working area of the SEL, …). On the 
other hand, the policy makers leave some room for the SEL to make own choices about their 
internal organization (i.e. more network like). For example, the Flemish government does 
not determine the division of mandates in the board structures. Also, it leaves the question 
open whether a general practitioner will be chosen as president or vice-president. A civil 
servant states: “And then you see that some networks do not have a general practitioner as 
president but as vice-president. That tells you something about the internal dynamics of the 
network”. Thirdly, the SEL are free to allocate the financial resources to the different tasks. 
Finally, the partners are free to decide if they want to set up local units or not. 
Secondly, the Flemish government takes up a role as framing entity. The objectives and tasks 
of the SEL express the vision of the Flemish government about the position of the SEL in the 
field. As such, the policy maker wants the SEL to be a point of mutual interest in the region. 
Also, the SEL needs to activate the cooperation between professional care tenders and 
stimulate the coordination of multidisciplinary consultation in home care (Primary Health 
Care Decree, Art. 9). However, the respondents state that the Flemish government lacks  
vision. This is for instance reflected in the tasks of the SEL. “In fact this is a ridiculous way of 
spending public resources. You get an amount of money and deal with it. There’s not much 
vision behind that. The SEL have a number of tasks, receive money to do this and each SEL 
implements the tasks in a different way” (respondent 8). Another respondent states: “I 
sometimes have the feeling that the Flemish government passes the responsibility to the field 
with the so-called reason we want to give them a say. But that’s not correct in my opinion” 
(respondent 3). 
The Agency of Welfare and Health is responsible for the external audit of the network 
(Administrative Order, 2008: Art. 30). For instance, the SEL are required to make an annual 
budget. The Agency checks the allocation of the financial means over the different tasks. 
This could be a straight hierarchical way of intervening in the network. At the local level, this 
is merely felt as a technical type of control. At the end of each year, the SEL present a report 
in which is described how the 12 tasks are implemented. However, the reports are mainly of 
a quantitative nature. Interviewees state that this type of inspection does not cover the real 
functioning of the SEL. One respondent states: “But the reports will be positive because it is 
really easy to write a lot of good-looking nonsense and repeat this every year.” In the 
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questionnaire, 75% of the respondents does agree that the evaluation of the annual report is 
only a formality.  
Impact of central coordination on local network dynamics 
The first component of network functioning is the division and use of power amongst the 
network members. The analysis shows great differences in the way power is distributed in 
SEL Ghent. It is clear that the health insurance organizations and the related services (i.e. 
home help/care services) possess most resources. “If you ask me who has the power I say 
the big organizations. If you ask me for a reason, I say this is because they are way better 
organized than we are” (respondent 8). More specifically, respondents refer to the power of 
the organizations linked to the Christian grouping or pillar.5 First of all, these organizations 
have a lot of internal expertise, knowledge and capacity (both financially and in terms of 
work force). In Flanders, the delivery of home care has always been a fundamental part of 
the work of these organizations. Also today, they are still the biggest partner in the 
organization of MDO. Partners state that the field workers do a good job and some are glad 
that the health insurance organizations accomplish this task. However, the fact that the SEL 
are free to determine the compensations that are given to participants of MDO has led to 
some major discussions in the board structures. “And then the power games begin of 
partners who claim a certain reward for participation in those consultations” (respondent 
10).  
Externally, the health insurance organizations are also well organized. They are represented 
in a lot of board structures and have a lot of contacts, also at the political level. “You can try 
to ignore them but they are everywhere. They have staff members at all the right positions” 
(respondent 2). They use these channels to defend their interests. “They have a lot of 
money, a lot of influence and a lot of expertise. They can go to the minister and argument 
why they need money for this of that. The Agency has also expertise, but not so much as they 
have” (respondent 2). Respondents (except those of the powerful organizations) criticize 
their dominant attitude in the board structures of SEL Ghent. For instance, they claim the 
role of MDO-coordinator to get the extra subsidies attached to it. This is confirmed by a 
                                                          
5
 Traditionally, health care in Flanders is organized by plural ideological groupings or so-called pillars (divided in 
the Christian, the liberal and the socialistic grouping), whereby the Christian grouping is the biggest. 
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member of a home help service. “It gives extra opportunities for our organization. Our 
funding [from the Flemish government] does not fully cover our expenses. That’s why we 
search for additional financial resources so we can work properly” (respondent 5). 
The second criterion is trust. Competence trust refers to the relevance of the partners in the 
context of the network goals. In general, respondents judge the presence of the other 
disciplines as useful. Behavioral trust is measured by perceptions of fairness and goodwill. 
We make a distinction between the level of behavioral trust in the decentralized SEL units 
and in the board structures of the SEL. In the decentralized units the field workers do not see 
each other as concurrent but as colleagues, all going for the same goal. This is however not 
the case in the board structures. Some respondents state there is mistrust, others choose 
their wording more carefully not mentioning the word ‘distrust’ but noticing an ‘attentive 
and alert position’ amongst the partners.  
With regard to the topic of network management we analyzed the activities of the network 
coordinator. In SEL Ghent, the coordinator is more an administrator than a network 
manager. Amongst other things, his tasks include the registration of activities, sending 
invitations for meetings, taking notes during meetings, making reports, ..  Some respondents 
support the fact that the coordinator does not take up more process oriented activities as 
included in the four management roles of Agranoff and McGuire. “Of course, the more he or 
she gets to know this matter, the more likely it is that he or she will develop a vision of his or 
her own. And that vision is then also brought in during meetings, while I think the following: 
this is not your place or mandate,” (respondent 3). Other respondents however welcome  a 
more proactive attitude of the coordinator. “It really is the coordinator that needs to put 
things in motion and help to lead and monitor, to give some direction.” (respondent 7). 
However, respondent 1 and 2 explain that the coordinator gets strict orders from the 
Management Board, limiting the possibilities to take own initiative .  Respondent 2 states: 
“From the moment he takes own initiative he is impeded by the Management Board. By 
some persons of the Management Board.” Following the coordinator, some partners are 
very eager to keep things the way they are. Especially, those who do not want to shift the 
balances in the expenses. Amore active attitude from the coordinator leading to new 
initiatives would also require money for them. Since the annual subsidies are more or less 
stable, this means that existing expenditure items would be economized or redistributed - 
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there would be less money for the support of MDO (49% of the annual budget). Since the 
health insurance organizations get the bulk of this money, they are the partners who block 
an independent position from the coordinator who might develop new initiatives. 
The last component is leadership. Art. 8 of the Administrative Order requires a general 
practitioner to be chosen as president or vice-president of the network. In general, partners 
from SEL Ghent are convinced about the added value of this directive, because a general 
practitioner is seen as a key figure in situations of home care. One of the important roles of 
the president of SEL Ghent is to seek coherence between the partners and trying to bridge 
the different opinions. Respondents also state that the president of SEL Ghent has a clear 
vision and that he has a lot of commitment for the network goals. However, he lacks 
authority to make decisions that matter to keep the network going. The president explains: 
“I’m always rebuffed by the major organizations. Usually, they already block me in the 
executive committee, so that my ideas not even get on the agenda of the board meetings. As 
a chairperson, for certain matters, I am able to point to the fact that the network has certain 
legal responsibilities. But for now, I can only point to the vision and state that we have 
developed that together.” 
Performance of SEL Ghent at network level 
A SEL needs to aim for the optimization of primary health care in a specific region through 
the implementation of 12 concrete tasks. The intensity and work load of the tasks ranges 
from giving advice and organizing multidisciplinary schooling to give administrative support 
for home care and closing partnership agreements. 6 The latter are intended to facilitate the 
transition from home care to residential care and vice versa.  
The annual reports of SEL Ghent (2010 – 2012) show that not all tasks are equally 
implemented in this network. Respondents indicate several explanations. A first explanation 
mentioned by the network coordinator is the lack of budget and work force. “If you do new 
things you have to do it next to the things you already do so you cut yourselves in the fingers 
because as I already stated we have a lack of work force so that we cannot give full effort for 
all tasks” (respondent 2). In general, this quote is supported by the other respondents. One 
of the statements in the survey is the following: The Flemish government gives my SEL 
                                                          
6
 See annex 2 for a full overview  
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adequate funding to accomplish its mandatory tasks. 7 out of 9 respondents does not agree 
with this statement. One respondent has no opinion. Another statement measures if the SEL 
has enough staff to fulfill its tasks. Here the opinions are divided. 50% agrees and another 
50% does not agree. One respondent has no opinion 
Secondly, the board of directors decided to give only little attention to task 1 (provide an 
electronic overview of al care takers in the region) and task 5 (stimulating the 
implementation of e-health). The overall statement of the partners is that those tasks need 
to be taken up at central governmental level. Thirdly, some tasks formulated are so vague in 
wording that none of the partners really knows what they actually mean. Subsequently, the 
added value of these tasks remains unclear. This is for example the case for task 4 
(‘supporting multidisciplinary care paths’) and 7 (‘monitoring procedures for the evaluation 
of the capacity of self-care and the qualitative elaboration of care plans’). As such, only little 
attention is given to these assignments. 
In SEL Ghent, most effort is put in tasks 9 – 11: the administrative registration and control of 
the organization of multidisciplinary consultations in specific home care situations 
(multidisciplinair overleg, ‘MDO’). In an MDO, care workers from different disciplines 
(general practitioner, nurse, home help services, … ) need to synchronize their actions 
around the aid of one patient. The administrative support of MDO is of particular interest for 
the organized partners (i.e. health care insurance organizations and home care 
organizations) who are the main organizers of MDO. In 2012, 49 % of the annual budget was 
spent to a total of 463 MDO’s. For each MDO, a compensation of 200 EUR is donated to the 
organization who delivers the coordinator. In 2012, 51,4 % of those meetings were 
organized by organizations linked to the Christian health insurance organization (Annual 
report SEL Ghent, 2012). The other share is reserved for staffing costs. 
Analysis shows that the coordination of the mandatory tasks considered  a hierarchical 
coordination strategy at first sight, is in fact more of a network based nature. The SEL have 
(or take?) the autonomy to give more attention to certain tasks, based on local dynamics. 
Besides the mandatory tasks, a SEL has the possibility to start up local projects. In the case of 
SEL Ghent, the competence to take initiative has been given to the local SEL units. However, 
the Board of Directors needs to give its permission to start up a project. If so, the 
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decentralized unit receives financial means from the central SEL level to implement the 
project. Respondents from the local SEL units criticize this procedure for being too strict. In 
the SIT period, local units had full autonomy to start up projects and implement them with 
own financial means. Now, local members feel a dominant attitude of the SEL board. This is 
the reason that local units take very little initiative (in general limited to one or two 
proposals a year). 
A more fundamental reason for the modest number of content or substantive outcomes 
provided by this network is the lack of process oriented values. A first process value is the 
development of a shared vision. Already in 2010, SEL Ghent formulated a vision statement 
that is supported by the partners. However, the formulation of this text was a real balancing 
act. “And then one person stumbles across one word that has as specific meaning in their 
context and then they search for another word. Finally, the mission and vision are formulated 
in such general terms that they have no power” (respondent 3). The interviews made clear 
that also today the different disciplines do not speak the same language and do not share 
the same vision about the way primary care should be delivered. “There are opposing visions 
in a lot of matters” (respondent 5). The question is then if partners are willing to exceed 
their own vision for the benefit of the network as a whole. The president made clear that 
this is not the case. “I wrote as a title ‘vision of the network’. The members of the 
Management Board have ripped the text immediately and said: ‘this is not true. It is a 
network composed out of different organizations and some organizations confirm that this 
could be a vision.’ I think this is a great example of the fact that we do not have a real 
network here. The organizations ’s interest will always come first.” In the questionnaire, 85% 
of the respondents indicate that the functioning of their SEL is hindered by opposing visions 
and concerns. 
The second criteria used to analyze the process values of this network is internal legitimacy. 
Internal legitimacy refers to the degree of network commitment. We make network 
commitment tangible by examining the presence of the partners in the board meetings. 
Usually, the representation in the Board of Directors is rather low. “It is always a struggle to 
find enough people to vote. It is always counting mandates, recruiting representatives so 
there can be a legal vote” (respondent 7). However, we find a clear difference between the 
presence of independent care takers on the one hand (for example general practitioners and 
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independent nurses) and representatives of organizations at the other. One representative 
of a home care organization states: “It is our job, we get paid for it. But I can perfectly 
imagine that it is a ‘far from my bed situation’ for self-employed persons” (respondent 7). A 
respondent from a local social office notices: “Of course, the big organizations drive their 
representatives to go to the meetings. Their concern is a lot bigger than ours” (respondent 
8). Also at the level of the field workers the enthusiasm for the partnership is rather low. 
This is for instance reflected in the number of project initiatives and the representation in 
local meetings.  
The third process outcome is the degree of ‘networking’. Some respondents state that the 
network has an added value because people get to know each other. This is both mentioned 
by members of the board structures and members of the local units. One field worker of a 
health insurance organization explains: “You sit together with people from other 
organizations and services who are also active in the field of home care. It is important that 
you see each other and sometimes do things together. It all starts with getting to know each 
other” (respondent 4). However, as explained before, this statement is not supported by 
disciplines who are active on a local scale. Another nuance is the fact that four respondents 
clearly state that the network has no added value for them at all. “The general opinion in our 
organization is that the SEL can be shut down. We do not see the added value of this 
network. For my organization, the most important thing is the optimization of care around 
the bed of a patient in a home situation. In the SEL, a lot of money is going to things that for 
us do not lead to a better care for the patient” (respondent 7) 
We conclude that the opinions of the partners about the added value of the network for the 
optimization of care are rather moderate. However, we notice a clear divergence between 
different groupings. For instance, there is a clear partition between the centrally organized 
partners on the one hand and the locally embedded ones on the other. Also, there are 
different viewpoints depending on the position in the network (board member vs. field 
workers). In general, board members are more positive about the value of the network. 
According to some respondents this is because they have no contact with the field. 
5. Discussion & conclusion  
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The focus of this paper was on the impact of central – local relations with regard to the 
performance of local mandated service delivery networks set up by central government. We 
now draw some conclusions about the way the Flemish government coordinates the Primary 
Health Care networks and what effects are on the functioning of the network on the one 
hand, and about the way politics and power affect both the coordination practice and the 
networks’ performance on the other. 
Strong formal control, little actual control, and the impact thereof on performance 
In terms of the coordination practice by the Flemish government, it is clear that the central 
level coordinates in a hands-off manner, by designing and framing the network and its 
operations. In doing so, it relies heavily on hierarchical instruments, most notably legislation 
to define the network structure and to outline the network objectives and its concrete tasks. 
However, despite limited autonomy from a formal point of view, our qualitative case study 
shows that the local partners still have and use some actual autonomy to make own choices 
with regard to their internal organization and functioning. That autonomy is increased by the 
fact that the Agency of Healthcare, which controls the functioning of the SEL hierarchically 
via annual reports and budget control, does only focus on compliance on paper. Most 
network members consider delivering these documents only a formality. While this 
enhances the actual autonomy of the network to a certain extent, respondents also 
criticized central government for lacking vision and responsibility for the networks’ activities, 
rather hampering than improving network performance. For most actors, central 
government should be a more active partner in the network, rather than an absent landlord, 
if all network goals should be achieved. Hence, the actual coordination mix impacts the local 
dynamics and also effects the performance of this network. SEL Ghent implements some of 
its legal tasks, but not all. Most effort is put in the administrative support of MDO 
consultation, since this clearly affects the (financial) interests of the partners. The position of 
the Flemish government also acts upon the process outcomes of this network. The lack of 
vision and support for the SEL causes some major discussions between the partners.   
Coordination practice affected by institutional power and politics 
In terms of the importance of power and politics to understand the coordination practice 
and the network performance, two main observations can be made. The first observation is 
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that the Flemish government is not a uniform entity in this case. Although a lot of network 
research refers to government as a single entity, our analysis shows that the concept covers 
multiple levels. Each level plays its own role and has an impact on the functioning of the 
network. First, we need to make a distinction between the public administration level and 
the political level. This is because the coordinating role of network designer and network 
framer is the result of the interplay between civil servants of the Agency of Healthcare and 
the political leaders (i.e. the Flemish Minister of Welfare Public Health and Family and his 
administration). Secondly, and of particular importance in the Flemish context, we notice the 
presence of powerful private organizations that are active on both the central and local 
level, but also try to play at the political and the administrative (or service) level. These 
organizations are not only service providers, but have representatives in the political system 
and have an important vote in the formulation of policy directives. As such, they have 
become an institutionalized part of ‘government’ in the domain of welfare and health. 
Moreover, the political level is lobbied by different interest groups, all trying to defend their 
concerns at the central level. These are for example the lobby of health insurance 
organizations (‘Zorgnet Vlaanderen’), the lobby of the general practitioners, the partnership 
of cities and communities (‘VVSG’) that defends the concerns of the local social offices, … 
Our ongoing research will make clear if this practice is also the case in other policy domains. 
The second observation is about the meaning of ‘steering and coordination’. In the original 
framework we use the concept of meta-governance and the H-M-N trinity to conceptualize 
the coordination activities of central government. However, our analysis shows that the 
meta-governance roles and the coordination instruments, are in fact the outcome of more 
fundamental (power) relations. Hence, the study of C-L relations in the context of local 
mandated service delivery networks cannot be limited to an analysis of the rather technical 
instruments (as written down in the Decree and the Administrative Order), being the first 
and most visible layer. We need to dig deeper and unravel the underlying mechanisms of 
these regulations if we want to come to a full understanding of steering and coordination 
and the impact hereof on local dynamics and network performance. It is clear that (political) 
power should be a key component in the analysis of meta-governance if we want to 
understand why certain coordination strategies are developed or not, and why they work or 
not. In this case, it is for instance clear that the central and local levels are connected 
23 
 
through policy networks – in which local organizations and their parent and umbrella 
organizations join forces with political allies - that shape the legislation that ultimately 
defines the service delivery networks capacities and autonomy. These observations result in 
an adapted framework of central – local relations and network performance in this context. 
We will use this elaborated framework in our ongoing research. 
Figure 2 – Adapted framework of network performance in C – L relations 
NETWORK CONTEXT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Central level  
 
 
 
 
                 Meta-governance /  
  coordination  instruments 
                                                    Corporatism      Historical             …                      
                                 sociological  
                                                                                     institutionalism  
Local level                                                                                                 
 
Civil service Politicians  
Representatives of 
private organisations 
Lobby 
associations 
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Annex 1 – Overview of respondents  
No. Discipline Name of organisation Position of member Date of interview 
1 / / Coordinator 30/05/2013 
2 General practitioner 
Huisartsenvereniging 
Gent vzw 
President / member 
AV, RvB and DB * 31/05/2013 
3 
Health insurance 
organisations 
Bond Moyson Oost-
Vlaanderen - DMW member AV/ RvB 15/05/2013 
4 
Health insurance 
organisations 
Christelijke 
Mutualiteit Midden-
Vlaanderen  member AV 16/05/2013 
5 Home help services 
Familiehulp vzw - 
Zorgregio Gent member AV / RvB 23/05/2013 
6 General practitioner 
Huisartsenvereniging 
Groot-Lochristi member AV/ RvB 17/05/2013 
7 Home care services  
Solidariteit voor het 
Gezin - dienst 
thuisverpleging member AV / RvB 24/05/2013 
8 Local social office OCMW Nazareth member AV/ Rvb/ DB 15/05/2013 
9 Hospital AZ Deinze member AV 27/06/2013 
10- 
11 / 
Agency of Welfare 
and Health Civil servant 
21/11/2012 
19/12/2012 
 
* AV: General Assembly 
RvB: Board of Directors 
DB: Management Board 
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Annex 2 – Survey (translation of original Dutch version) 
  Totally 
disagree 
Disagree Agree Totally 
agree 
No opinion/ 
N/A 
1 Internal decentralization gives a SEL 
enough room to adjust its actions 
to local needs 
     
2 My SEL gets sufficient subsidies 
from the Flemish government to 
carry out its legal tasks 
     
3 The switch in financing policy from 
an output based system (SIT) to 
input based financing (SEL) turned 
out to be a good decision 
     
4 I support the synchronization of the 
working area of the SEL to the 
regional care areas (15 regions ) 
instead of the local care areas (60 
regions)  
     
5 The audit of the annual reports is 
merely a formal/technical type of 
control 
     
6 I think there are too little personal 
relations between my SEL and civil 
servants of the Agency of Welfare 
and Health 
     
7 The annual seminar between the 
SEL and the minister is a ‘talking 
shop’ – it has no impact 
whatsoever 
     
8 The number of annual supported 
MDO is a good indicator for the 
functioning of my SEL 
     
9 In my opinion, civil servants of the 
Agency need to take up a mediating 
role if discussions or conflicts arise 
between the partners of my SEL 
     
10 It’s nonsense that the Flemish 
government only allows actors in 
primary care to be a partner of the 
SEL 
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  Totally 
disagree 
Disagree Agree Totally agree No opinion / 
n/a 
11 If the coordinator would be a civil 
servant of the Agency, this would 
enhance the strength of the SEL 
     
12 My SEL has insufficient staff to 
carry out all 12 legal tasks 
     
13 I support the obligation to choose a 
general practitioner as president or 
vice-president of the SEL 
     
14 The policy choices of the Flemish 
government correspond to the 
needs in the field  
     
15 The Flemish government gives 
insufficient financial incentives to 
make collaboration agreements 
between my SEL and individual or 
associations of professional care 
givers 
     
16 Representatives of care users and 
care givers should be obligatory 
partners in the General Assembly 
     
17 Compensation fees for the 
participation to an MDO should be 
anchored in legal instructions 
     
18 The functioning of my SEL is 
hindered by conflicts of interest 
     
19 As a result of the open definition of 
the 12 legal tasks, opposing visions 
arise  with regard to their actual 
implementation  
     
20 In my opinion the next state reform 
will strengthen the position of the 
SEL in the care sector 
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